In this paper, we study the immunity of bankruptcy rules to manipulation via merging or splitting agents' claims. We focus on the TAL-family of bankruptcy rules (MorenoTernero & Villar, 2006), a one-parameter family encompassing three classical rules: the Talmud (T ) rule, the constrained equal-awards (A) rule and the constrained equal-losses (L) rule. We show that all rules within the TAL-family are partially non-manipulable and identify the domain of problems where each rule is either non-manipulable by merging or non-manipulable by splitting. We also show that they can be ranked in terms of their relative non-manipulability, according to the parameter that generates the family.
Introduction
When a firm goes bankrupt, how should its liquidation value be divided among its creditors? If a person dies and the debts left behind are found to exceed the worth of her estate, how then should the estate be divided? How should an amount of taxes be collected out of a population when the only information is the gross income of each individual? These questions are examples of the so-called bankruptcy problems, that provide a simple framework to study the most adequate way of rationing losses when the claims of the agents involved cannot be fully covered. There is an ample literature, that originates in a seminal paper by O'Neill (1982) , devoted to such problems. The main purpose of it is to identify well-behaved "rules" that associate with each problem a division among the claimants of the amount available. For surveys of this literature, the reader is referred to Moulin (2002) and Thomson (2003) .
The behavior of different rules comes from the properties those rules fulfill. In this paper, we focus on properties referring to strategic aspects. More precisely, we study the immunity of rules to coalitional manipulation. Manipulation of allocation rules has been studied by several authors in alternative contexts (e.g., O'Neill, 1982; Moulin, 1987; Chun, 1988; de Frutos, 1999; Ju, 2003; and Ju et al., 2007) . We consider here the framework of merging and splitting agents' claims. In other words, we let agents the possibility of consolidating their claims and be treated as a single claimant. Conversely, we also let a particular claimant to divide her claim and be "considered" as several different claimants. A rule is non-manipulable by merging if there is no incentive for a group of agents to merge their claims. In other words, the amount that a group of agents would obtain in the allocation, after pooling their claims, is not higher than the aggregate amount they obtain independently. Similarly, a rule is non-manipulable by splitting if there is no incentive for a single agent to split her claim and appear as several different claimants. In other words, the amount that an agent obtains in an allocation is not smaller than the aggregate amount she would have obtained had she divided her claim.
In real life, there are many situations in which manipulation via merging or splitting agents' claims may arise. In the US, for federal income tax purposes, married taxpayers can select either married filing jointly or married filing a separate return. In estate division, if creditors are banks, they could split their claims among their subsidiary banks. Another example comes from the regulations regarding deposit guarantee funds in bank institutions, where the guaranteed amount of a deposit is subject to a publicly known upper limit. Thus, a depositor whose deposit is above such upper limit has incentives to split it among different deposits below the limit, in order to ensure its complete refund in case of a bankruptcy of the bank institution.
It is well known that the proportional rule, which chooses awards proportional to claims, is the unique rule that is immune to all possible coalitional manipulations (e.g., Ju et al., 2007) . For this reason and its long tradition of use, proportionality is often taken as the definition of fairness for bankruptcy problems. We challenge here this position building on previous arguments appearing in the literature. For instance, several numerical examples are discussed in the Talmud, and recommendations are made for them that conflict with proportionality (e.g., Aumann & Maschler, 1985) . Also, there is a widely held view that if the amount to divide is small in relation to claims, equal division should prevail (e.g., Thomson, 2003; Dominguez & Thomson, 2006) . Furthermore, when the amounts in question are large and the claims very unequal, a good case can be made that it is fairer for the larger claimants to give up relatively more than the smaller ones. The reason is that a larger claimant feels the loss to a lesser degree; though she loses more, she can afford to do so because she is still relatively well off (e.g., Young, 1988) . Finally, there are environments in which only one type of manipulation is possible and therefore rules that are only immune to the feasible type of manipulations are as justified as the proportional rule on the grounds of this strategic aspect.
The other three most well-known and ancient rules for bankruptcy problems, apart from the proportional rule, are the Talmud ( T ) rule, which (as its name suggests) is inspired on the examples appearing in the Talmud, the constrained equal awards ( A) rule, and the constrained equal-losses ( L) rule, which can be both traced back to Maimonides. These three rules are particular members of the so-called TAL-family of bankruptcy rules (Moreno-Ternero & Villar, 2006) , a one-parameter family that generalizes a principle underlying the Talmud rule: individual rationing is of the same type of collective rationing. More precisely, for any given θ ∈ [0, 1], the rule R θ in this family imposes that nobody gets more than a fraction θ of her claim if the amount to divide is smaller than θ times the aggregate claim and nobody gets less than a fraction θ of her claim if the amount to divide exceeds θ times the aggregate claim. The rule associated with θ = 1 2 is the Talmud rule whereas the extreme values θ = 1 and θ = 0 correspond to the constrained equal awards rule and the constrained equal losses rule, respectively.
We show that all rules within the TAL-family are partially non-manipulable and identify the domain of problems where each rule is either non-manipulable by merging or non-manipulable by splitting.
Besides determining whether a rule is non-manipulable or not, one could also be interested in addressing the relative non-manipulability of two rules. We show that the rules within the TAL-family can be ranked in terms of their relative nonmanipulability (on a suitable partition of the space of problems) according to the parameter that generates the family. Hence, a precise interpretation of the parameter as an index of relative non-manipulability can be given.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we introduce the model and the TAL-family of rules. In Sec. 3, we establish the absolute non-manipulability of these rules whilst in Sec. 4 we establish their relative non-manipulability. We conclude in Sec. 5 with some final remarks.
The Model
Let N represent the set of all potential agents (a set with an infinite number of members) and let N be the family of all finite subsets of N. An element N ∈ N describes a finite set of agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, where we take |N | = n. A bankruptcy problem, or simply a problem, is a triple (N, E, c) , where N is the set of agents, E ∈ R ++ represents the amount to divide, and c ∈ R n + is a vector of claims whose ith component is c i , with i∈N c i > E > 0. We denote by B the family of all those problems. To simplify notation we write, for any given problem (N, E, c) ∈ B, C = i∈N c i . We assume, without loss of generality, that agents are labelled so that c 1 ≤ c 2 ≤ · · · ≤ c n .
A bankruptcy rule, or simply a rule, is a mapping defined on B that associates with every (N, E, c) ∈ B a unique vector x ∈ R n . This vector should satisfy the nonnegativity and claims boundedness inequalities 0 ≤ x ≤ c, and the efficiency requirement by which its coordinates should add up to E. Any such vector is an awards vector for (N, E, c). Let R be our generic notation for rules. The awards vector R(N, E, c) represents a desirable way of dividing E among the agents so that each agent receives an award that is non-negative and bounded above by her claim, and the entire amount is allocated.
Some of the bankruptcy rules share a common analytical feature: they are parametric rules, i.e., the share allotted by each rule to an agent can be expressed as a function of her claim and a parameter, which is related to the size of the amount to divide. More precisely, 
The richness of this property is captured in Young's classical result which states that, in the presence of continuity, a consistent and symmetric rule is a parametric rule (Young, 1987 ; Theorem 1).
The following family of parametric rules, the TAL-family, ( 
where λ and µ are chosen so that
Thus, all rules in the TAL-family share the feature of focussing on awards or losses, depending on the size of the amount to divide. This feature appears in the psychology and decision making literature, where it is well known that gains and losses are treated differently (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) .
One can visualize the rule R θ as follows. First, it applies equal division until the claimant with the smallest claim has obtained a fraction θ of her claim. Then, that agent stops receiving additional units and the remaining amount is divided equally among the other agents until the claimant with the second smallest claim gets the fraction θ of her claim. The process continues until every agent has received
1 The constrained equal-losses rule corresponds to the case θ = 0 (R 0 = L), whereas the constrained equal-awards rule corresponds to the other extreme value, θ = 1 (R 1 = A). The Talmud rule is obtained for θ = a fraction θ of her claim, or the available amount is distributed. If there is still something left after this process, agents are invited back to receive additional shares. Now agents receive additional amounts sequentially starting with those with larger claims and applying equal division of their losses (see Fig. 1 for further details).
To 
Non-Manipulability in Absolute Terms
This paper focuses on an important strategic aspect of the classical bankruptcy model: the manipulation by merging and splitting agents' claims. We say that a rule is non-manipulable by merging, if there is no incentive for a coalition Q ⊂ N to consolidate their claims (c i ) i∈Q into a single one c Q = i∈Q c i . Similarly, we say that a rule is non-manipulable by splitting if no single agent i ∈ N has incentive to represent her claim (N, E, c) . (N, E, c) .
A rule R is non manipulable on D ⊆ B, if it is simultaneously non-manipulable by merging and by splitting on D.
In this section, we deal with the non-manipulable behavior of the rules within the TAL-family. We need to introduce some additional notation first. Let τ (N, E, c) = E C stand for the share of the amount to divide in the aggregate claim of a given problem, and define
for each δ ∈ (0, 1). In other words, D δ is the domain of problems whose ratio between the amount to divide and the aggregate claim is δ. It is straightforward to show that {D δ } δ∈(0,1) constitutes a partition of rich domains of B.
The following result is obtained: [0, 1] denote the TAL-family, and let δ ∈ (0, 1) be given.
The following statements hold:
Proof. The manipulation via merging or splitting agents' claims of parametric rules can be tested by checking the curvature of a parametric representation in its second argument (claim). More precisely, a parametric rule with a convex (concave) in claim parametric representation is non-manipulable by splitting (merging) (e.g., de Frutos, 1999; Ju, 2003) . We then provide a parametric representation of the rules within the TAL-family and study its curvature in its second argument. Fix θ ∈ [0, 1] and consider the following function:
for all λ ∈ R ∪ {±∞}. Clearly, f θ is a continuous function, weakly monotonic in its first argument, and such that lim λ→−∞ f θ (λ, c i ) = 0, and lim λ→+∞ f θ (λ, c i ) = c i for all c i ∈ R + . It is straightforward to see that, given (N, E, c) ∈ B, we have the following: 
(1−θ)ci ] for all i ∈ N , and therefore, f θ (λ, c i ) = θc i , for all i ∈ N . As a result, for all (N, E, c) ∈ B, E, c) , for all i ∈ N , which shows that f θ is indeed a parametric representation of R θ .
Let δ ∈ (0, 1) be given and consider its corresponding domain of problems D δ .
Fix θ ∈ [0, 1] and consider the rule within the TAL-family R θ , and its subsequent parametric representation f θ , as defined in (1). We distinguish three cases.
Case 1: θ < δ In this case, E > θC for all (N, E, c) ∈ D δ . Then, as the discussion above shows, λ > 0 in the parametric representation (1). Therefore, f θ can be expressed as
which is a convex function on its second argument. Thus, R θ is NMS on D δ .
Case 2: θ > δ
In this case, E < θC for all (N, E, c) ∈ D δ . Then, the discussion above shows that λ < 0 in the parametric representation (1), and therefore,
which is a concave function on its second argument. Thus, R θ is NMM on D δ .
Case 3: θ = δ In this case, E = θC for all (N, E, c) ∈ D δ . Thus, it is straightforward to see that (ii) R θ is non manipulable by merging on B if and only if θ = 1.
Non-Manipulability in Relative Terms
Besides determining whether a rule is non-manipulable or not, one could also be interested in comparing the relative non-manipulability of different rules in terms of their outcomes. This can be done by introducing an index of non-manipulability that measures the difference between the resulting and primitive outcomes of the claimants who incurred in the manipulation. Such a difference can be contemplated as the magnitude of the incentive against the manipulation. Formally, let F and G be two rules and let D be a rich domain. We say that
for all (N, E, c) ∈ D and (M, E, c ), with M ⊂ N , and such that there is some
Similarly, we say that F is more NMS than G on D (which we write
The following result, whose proof appears in the Appendix, is obtained: 0, 1] denote the TAL-family, and let θ 1 and θ 2 ∈ [0, 1], such that θ 1 ≥ θ 2 , be given. Let δ ∈ (0, 1) be fixed. The following statements hold: As a direct consequence of Theorem 2, A = R 1 (L = R 0 ) is the least (most) manipulable by merging rule, whereas L (A) is the least (most) manipulable by splitting rule within the family, as expected, according to Theorem 1. Without loss of generality, we may assume that if R is a non-manipulable rule on a domain D, then M D (R) = S D (R) = 0. Consequently, we may also assume that M D (R) < 0 for all R which is manipulable by merging on D and S D (R) < 0 for all R which is manipulable by splitting on D. This convention and Theorem 2 provide us with a precise interpretation of the parameter θ that generates the TAL-family as an index of relative non-manipulability. More precisely, fix some δ ∈ (0, 1) and consider its corresponding domain of problems D δ . Up to affine transformations, the indexes of NMM and NMS for the TAL-family can be expressed as follows: 
Final Remarks
We conclude by considering a related aspect to this work. A bankruptcy problem can also be interpreted as a particular taxation problem (e.g., Young, 1988) . To do so, one just has to interpret the amount to divide in a bankruptcy problem as a given amount of taxes to be collected, and the vector of claims as the vector of (taxable) incomes. Therefore, a taxation problem can also be identified with a triple (N, E, c), with C ≡ i∈N c i > E. A tax rule is a mapping R that applies the space of taxation problems into the space of allocations. The solution proposed by the rule R is an allocation R(N, E, c) which specifies the amounts of taxes paid by the agents. Consequently, the TAL-family can also be interpreted as a family of tax rules. In the taxation jargon, the rules in this family can be regarded as consisting of two parts. One is a proportional contribution given by the value of the parameter θ. The other is a term that depends on whether the amount of taxes collected by this proportional system exceeds or falls short of what is required. More precisely, for any given θ ∈ [0, 1], if the amount of taxes to be collected is relatively small (namely E ≤ θC) the rule R θ imposes θ as the marginal tax rate, up to a certain income level, and 1 onwards. If, on the contrary, the amount of taxes to be collected is relatively large (namely E ≥ θC) the rule R θ imposes θ as the marginal tax rate, up to a certain income level, and 0 onwards.
The distributive impact of different tax rules is usually addressed by means of the notion of progressivity (see Moulin, 1988; 2003; or Le Breton et al., 1996; among others) . A tax rule is called progressive (regressive) when agents with larger incomes contribute relatively more (less). Given the above definition of the TAL-family, it is straightforward to show that R θ is progressive (regressive) on
Thus, the distributive impact of the rules within the TAL-family coincides exactly with its non-manipulable behavior, summarized in Theorem 1. Further connections between the notions of progressivity and non-manipulability are presented in Ju & Moreno-Ternero (2006 
Proof of (i)
Assume θ 1 ≥ θ 2 ≥ δ. We show that the joint loss that agents face by merging their claims into a claim of an agent in the group is higher under R θ1 than under R θ2 .
Formally, let N = {h, i, j}, and for
for k = 1, 2. 4 We analyze one of the five possible configurations of thresholds for E that determine the above expression:
It is also convenient for the ensuing proof to present the expressions of the rules for the problem (M, E, c ).
for k = 1, 2. We now distinguish several cases. − (E − θ 2 c 3 ) = l 2 , where again the inequality follows from the fact that 3θ 2 c 1 ≤ E. Case 3. 3θ 1 c 1 ≤ E ≤ θ 2 (c 1 + 2c 2 ).
In this case, R θ k (N, E, c) = (θ k c 1 ,
) for k = 1, 2. There are several subcases. Subcase 3.1. E ≤ 2θ 2 c m .
Note that in this subcase, it cannot happen that c m = c 1 , i.e., the only feasible coalitions are those containing agent 1. And for those coalitions, it happens that l 1 = 
